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In the

Supreme Court of the State of Utah
FRED BUTZ,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

vs.

Case No.
7441

UNION P ACIFTC RAILROAD COMPANY, a corporation,
Defendant and Respondent.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
This is a suit to recover damages for personal injuries
brought by Fred Butz against the Union Pacific Railroad
Company, his employer. The accident resulting in plaintiff's
injuries occurred at the yard of,the Denver Union T'erminal
Company on the 9th of September, 1948. On that day Butz ,
was injured while riding the side of a cut of cars by striking against certain baggage trucks which were placed on
'It
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a platform adjacent to a track 'in the Denver Union Terminal
·Company yards. The accident happpened in broad daylight.
The plaintiff alleges in his complaint that the accident
was proximately caused by the negligence of the defendant
in that the defendant "negligently, carelessly and recklessly
left not less than ten baggage trucks" along a platform adjacent to the track and so close thereto as to impair the
clearance. At the trial the evidence showed beyond any
question that the defendant had not left the trucks in the
place where the accident occurred but that to the contrary
these baggage trucks had been left in the place where they
w~ere standing at the time of the accident .by employes of
the Denver Union Terminal Company, a corporation
separate and distinct from the Union Pacific Railroad
Company. It therefore appearing to the court that the
plaintiff had failed in his proof on the grounds of negligence alleged, and also that the plaintiff had failed in the
proof of any negligence on the part of the defendant company, the defendant's motion :for a nonsuit was granted.
STAT'EMENT O·F THE F'ACT'S
1

T'he statement of the facts which is contained in the
plaintiff's brief is accurate in so far as it goes. The plaintiff neglects to mention certain portions of the evidence
which to us seem important and we are therefore compelled
to make the following addition to the statement of facts
outlined by plaintiff :
At the time of the accident the plaintiff himself was
stationed on the north side of the moving cut of cars at
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3
what is known in railroad language as the "point." This
means that the plaintiff was on the leading end of the leading car for the express purpose of keeping a lookout ahead.
Butz admitted on cross-examination that part of his job
was to keep a proper lookout along the track to discover
any impaired clearance which might exist (R. 97), and he
further admitted that he was, in effect, the eyes of the
switch crew for the purpose of ascertaining the condition
of the track along which the cut of cars was being moved
(R. 98). Butz testified that every other man on the switch
crew had performed his job in a proper manner (R. 94). He
admitted that the engineer of the engine shoving the cut
of cars at the time of the accident made a good stop in the
emergency which was presented at the time of the accident
(R. 94). These facts seem to us important in that they
demonstrate ( 1) that the plaintiff made no question sufficient to go to the jury on the negligence of any other
member of the crew with which he was working, so that
any recovery must necessarily be based on conduct of the
defendant independent of the actions of the crew with which
plaintiff was working; and (2) that the Union P·acific
Railroad Company exercised reasonable care under the
circumstances by causing the plaintif himself to be stationed
in a position where he could observe any dangerous condition which might lead to an accident and could thereupon
give timely warning to the other members of the crew
thereof.
The plaintiff's appeal is grounded upon the court's
granting of the defendant's motion for a nonsuit. In support of his position the plaintiff has urged three points or
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4
argum~nts

as set forth on page 11 of his brief. We accept
the issues raised by these points and our argument may
therefore be summarized as follows :

POINT I
THE TRIAL ·COURT C·ORRE~c·TLY HELD AS A
MATTER OF LAW THAT T'HE D~EFENDANT WAS
NOT NEGLIGENT.
POIN'T II
THE TRIAL COURT CORRE~CTLY HELD AS A
MATTER .O'F LAW THAT PLAINTIF1F'S CONT·RIBUTORY N'EGLIGENCE wAS TIHE SOLE PROXIMATE
CAUSE OF HIS INJURIES.
P·OINT III
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT DEPRIVE T'HE
PLAINTIFF OF HIS RIGHT T'O TRIAL B,Y JURY.
I

AR.GUMENT
P·OINT I
THE TRIAL COURT C·ORR.EC'TLY HELD AS A
MATT'ER OF LAW THAT T'HE DEFENDANT WAS
NOT NEGLIGENT.
'The sole problem presented by plaintiff's Point No. 1
lies in the question as to whether or not the plaintiff made a
jury question on the matter of the defendant's negligence by
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the evidence which he produced at the trial. To. meet the
burden of proving negligence on the part of the defendant,
which the Federal Employers' Liability Act imposes as a
condition of liability, the plaintiff has advanced two
theories. Stated in the reverse order to that used by the
plaintiff, these theories are basically as follows:
1. The defendant was itself negligent in failing to furnish plaintiff a safe place to work.
2. The employes of the Denver Union Terminal Company negligently created a dangerous place
to work to which the plaintiff was sent by the defendant and therefore the negligence of the employes of the Denver Union Terminal Comp~ny is
legally imputed to the defendant company, though
such employes of the Denver Union Tlerminal Company are not employes of the Union Pacific.
The first point presents no unusual theory of liability.
We concede that the plaintiff 'is entitled to have his case go
to a jury if he made a question of fact on the matter of
negligence on the part of the defendant proximately contributing to the accident. T'he rule of law which is determinative of defendant's duty to the plaintiff might be
stated as follows : The defendant had a duty to exercise
reasonable care to furnish the plaintiff with a reasonably
safe place to work. This duty continued to exist even though
the defendant may have sent the plaintiff onto the premises
of another. At page 12: of his brief the plaintiff has stated
this rule in substantially the foregoing language and we
accept this statement. ~c·onsequently, to determine whether
or not a jury question was presented on this theory of
liability it is necessary to examine the facts of the case at
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bar in reference to the rule. At the outset we call to the
court's attention the fact that the plaintiff did not actually
allege that the defendant had violated this duty which the
law imposed of exercising reasonable care to furnish a
reasonably safe place to work. Actually, he alleged that the
defendant had left the hand trucks in the position creating
impaired clearance. But if the plaintiff's complaint be construed as an attempt to allege a violation of the duty to
furnish a safe place to work (as plaintiff now apparently
contends it should be construed) , nevertheless, examination
of the evidence in the case at bar shows an absolute failure
of proof on an important element necessary to a finding
that defendant had negligently breached this duty.
We respectfully submit that in order to charge the
defendant with negligence in failing to exercise reasonable
care under all the circumstances it was absolutely necessary
to the plaintiff's case that he show that the defendant had
notice, either actual or constructive, of the dangerous condition of the place of work shown to exist. See 35 Am. Jur.,
Sec. 127.
In the recent case of Lasagna v. McCarthy et al., 111
Utah 269, 177 P. (2d) 734, this court af~er quoting from
the Ellis case decided by the Supreme ·Court of the United
States, said :
"As Mr. Justice Douglas of the Supreme Court
of the United States said in the latest pronouncement on this subject, in the case of Ellis v. Union
Pacific Ry. Co., 67 S. ~ct. 598, 600, speaking of the
Federal Employers Liability Act,
''The Act does not make the employer the
insurer of the safety of his employees while
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they are on duty. The basis of his liability is
his negligence, not the fact that injuries occur. And that negligence must be 'in whole
or in part' the cause of the injury.'
"Negligence of the employer being the basis
for recovery under the Federal Employers' Liability
Act, it is well to return to the ordinary definition of
the term, which is
'the omission to do something which a
reasonable person, guided by those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct
of human affairs, would do: or the doing of
something which a prudent person under
like circumstances would not do.' "
Failure to take affirmative action to correct a dangerous condition of the place of work might constitute negligence as defined above under some circumstances; but it
can never constitute negligence until it is shown that the
defendant company knew, or should have known, of the
existence of the dangerous condition of the premises. Perhaps the best case illustrating our contention is the case of
Waller v. Northern Pacific Terminal Company of O·regon,
166 P. (2d) 488, certiorari denied 329 U. S. 742, rehearing
on petition for certiorari denied 329 U. S. 82·5. In that case,
which was decided by the Supreme Court of Oregon in 1946,
the facts appeared to be that the plaintiff was employed
by the defendant railroad company as an engine foreman
on a switching crew. The plaintiff had attempted to board
a moving cut of cars in the nighttime and had fallen, receiving personal injuries. He sued under the Federal Employers' Liability Act and alleged that his accident was
caused by negligence of the defendant in that (a) the de-
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fendant negligently maintained the ground alongside the
track in a slick and muddy condition, and (b) in that the
defendant negligently permitted sticks and debris to be
strung along the ground area which plaintiff was required
to use in mounting the cars. Plaintiff alleged that the defendant had thereby failed to furnish the plaintiff with
a safe place to work. There were other allegations of negligence but they are not materia! to the problem in the case
at bar.
The evidence at the trial showed that the defendant
owned and maintained the yards where the accident occurred. It appeared, however, that the yards were also
used for loading and unloading freight cars and that, the
work of loading and unloading such cars was performed
by employes of other railroad companies and by employes
of forwarding companies. The only work which was performed in this yard by the defendant company consisted
of switching and spotting cars and in making up trains to
be delivered to other carriers. It was further shown by
the evidence that debris such as sticks and pieces of wood
was ordinarily deposited in the yard during the activity
of loading and unloading cars. T'he evidence also showed
that the yards were ·cleaned at least once each day. The
plaintiff testified that as he attempted to board a moving
cut of cars he stepped on a stick which turned or rolled
under his left foot, causing him to fall and suffer the injuries for which suit was brought. In determining that the
plaintiff had not made a sufficient case on which a jury
could be permitted to find liability, the Supreme ·Court of
Oregon made a very thorough and careful analysis of the
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problem, involving a study of a great number of cases decided by the Supreme ·Court of the United S.tates. and other
courts. To set forth in detail the discussion of the problem
by the Oregon court 'viii require a lengthy quotation from
the case, but the opinion is so directly in point with the
case at bar and appears to us to be such a logical and competent consideration of the problem that the incorporation
of a considerable part thereof in our brief appears to be
justified. The Oregon court's statement is as follows:
"Turning from the evidence concerning the
actual point of the accident and considering the evidence concerning the general conditions in the yard,
we find evidence that sticks and debris did fall into
the yard from time to time. The uncontradicted
evidence is that the debris resulted from loading
and unloading operations in the yards as freight was
carried by trucks through the box cars and over the
gangplanks. The uncontradicted evidence is that
these operations were carried on by employees of the
various railroad companies and forwarding compainies. There is not a scintilla of evidence that the
defendant terminal company ever placed or caused
to fall into the yard any sticks or debris. It neither
loaded nor unloaded cars. Its sole function was to
conduct switching operations upon cars to be loaded
or unloaded by others. The uncontradicted evidence
is that the yards were cleaned every day, including
the day before, the day of, and the day after the
accident. There is no testimony that any sticks or
debris ever remained in the yards for any time
longer than the period from the end of one day's inspection to the end of the next day's inspection. In
other words, there is no evidence that the yards
were not completely cleaned at least once each day.
The duty of the defendant concerning the mile or
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more of trackage in the 0 yard was no different
from its duty as to the many miles of tracks in the
other yards of the defendant. The very size and
character of the area differentiate this case from
those which relate to inspection of depots and stores
having limited area and accommodating dense
pedestrian traffic. The complaint contains no allegation of any failure or insufficiency of inspec,
tion.
"Under the Federal Employers' Liability Act,
45 U. S. C. A. Sec. 51 et seq., a defendant employer
can be held liable only for negligence proximately
causing the injury. Liability cannot be predicated
on mere speculation. (Citing cases.)
"The rights which the Act creates are federal
rights protected by federal rather than by local
rules of law. The rights and obligations of plaintiff
and defendant depend upon the statute and upon
applicable principles of common law as interpreted
by, the federal courts. (Citing cases.)
"So far as concerns the duty of an employer to
furnish a safe place in which to work, the federal
interpretation of the employer's duty under the F.
E. L. A. is derived from and is consistent with the
general common law. McGivern v. Northern Pac.
R. Co., 8 Cir., 132 F. 2d 213.
"'In this situation the employer's liability is
to be determined under the general rule which defines negligence as the lack of due care under the
circumstances; or the failure to do what a reasonable and prudent man would ordinarily have done
under the circumstances of the situation; or doing
what such a person under the existing circumstances
would not have done.' (Citing cases.)
"The defendant is not the insurer of the safety
of its employees and is not under any obligation to
keep the pr~mises absolutely safe. ('Citing cases.)
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"Failure to guard against a bare possibility of
accident is not actionable negligence. Brady v.
Southern R. Co., supra. · The plaintiff must present
more than a mere scintilla of evidence of negligence.
Substantial evidence is required. McGivern v. Northern Pac. R. Co., supra; Poe v. Illinois Central Railroad Co., 335 Mo. 507, 73 S. W. 2d 77H.
" 'It cannot be said that the situation did not
present dangers but danger in a particular phase of
an employment does not necessarily imply negligence. * * * Temporary conditions created by
employees using or failing to use appliances furnished by the employer are not defects for which the
employer may be held responsible in damages.'
McGivern v. Northern Pac. R. Co., supra, 132 F.
2d 213, 217.
"In the case at bar the condition of which plaintiff complains was at ~ost a temporary condition
and one not cr_eated by the employees, but by others
who were lawfully in the yard. If the plaintiff fails
to present substantial evidence that the injury was
proximately caused by the defendant's negligence, /
the trial court is authorized to grant a directed verdict.
" 'When the evidence is such that without
weighing the credibility of the witnesses there can
be but one reasonable conclusion as to the verdict,
the court should determine the proceeding by nonsuit, directed verdict or otherwise in accordance
with the applicable practice without submission to
the jury, or by judgment notwithstanding the verdict. By such direction of the trial the result is saved
from the mischance of speculation over legally unfounded claims.' Brady v. Southern R. Co., supra,
320 U. S. 476, 64 S. Ct. 234.
"In actions brought in state courts upon causes
arising under the F. E. L. A., the state appellate
court is authorized to determine from the evidence
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whether a verdict for plaintiff is supported by substantial evidence, and, if not so supported, may reverse and direct judgment for the defendant, subject,
however, to review of its conclusions by the United
States Supreme Court. (Citing cases) ; and see
Driggers v. Atlantic Coast Line R. ~Co., 151 S. C.
164, 148 S. E. 889, at page 913~, where the state
court pursuant
to mandate
of the United States
,
.
Supreme Court entered JUdgment for the defendant.
"The fact that an accident occurred constituted
no evidence of negligence on the part of the defendant in view of the use of the yard by others for
whom the defendant was not responsible. The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur does not apply and the
mere fact that the accident occurred raises no inference or presumption that the defendant was negligent or that its action or inaction was the cause of
the accident. Patton v. Texas & Pacific Railway 'Co.,
supra.
i
"Under the circumstances of this case, the
general rule concerning the duty owed by the owner
of land to persons employed or invited thereon applies. The duty of the defendant under the F. E.
L... A. is the same as the duty of a proprietor to invi ted guests as 'far as the rule now to be considered
is concerned.
"The rule is firmly established that where
plaintiff slips upon an object upon the premises of
the defendant, plaintiff must, in order to establish
liability, show that the defendant or his agent put
the dangerous object there, or that they knew or by
the exercise of reasonable diligence could have
known that it was there and failed to exercise diligence to remove it. (·Citing cases.)
"Since there is no evidence that the defendant
caused any dangerous condition on any part of the
0 yard, it can be held liable, if at all, only upon
the theory that it negligently failed to remove an
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object, or objects, deposited there by others. Assuming that the plaintiff stepped on a stick, there is
no evidence that the defendant knew of its existence,
nor is the defendant chargeable with constructive
notice that any stick was on the ground at the· point
where plaintiff slipped for there is no evidence as
to how long the stick, if any, had been there.
"As applied to the place where plaintiff fell, the
foregoing authorities are directly in point. The only
distinction which could be urged lies in the fact
that there is some evidence in the case at bar that
sticks and debris were frequently dropped in the
yard by third parties prior to the time of the accident. It may be conceded that if the evidence had
disclosed that debris was strewn generally about the
area where the accident occurred and if the defendant had negligently allowed it to remain there with
notice of its existence, then the defendant's knowledge of the general condition prevailing would have
been sufficient to support a verdict for the plaintiff even though the defendant did not know of the
particular stick on which the plaintiff slipped. But
that was not the case here.
"Plaintiff's own evidence established that debris
which was dropped in the yard did not continue
therein. The undisputed facts are that the yard was
inspected daily and cleaned daily. 'There is, therefore, no room for a mere inference that the debris
from previous days remained at the time of the
accident or that the area was so strewn with debris
as to create a general condition of danger, notice of
which might be equivalent to notice of the particular
object on which plainti~f may have slipped.
"In the present state of the record we have
grave doubts of the relevancy of the evidence which
was received over defendant's objection and which
concerned conditions in the yards days, and even
weeks, prior to the accident. There is no contention
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that defendant did ·not maintain an adequate system
of inspection and no evidence that further and additional inspection would have discovered any stick
at the point where plaintiff slipped. The only
'splinters' discovered after the accident were lying
near the rail and would have been under the overhang of any freight car on the track at that point.
"Under these circumstances we think it was
incumbent upon the plaintiff to show that the
specific condition alleged to have caused the plaintiff's fall had existed for a sufficient period of time
to charge the defendant with constructive notice
thereof, or else to show that the general system of
inspection throughout the yards and under all of
the circumstances was insufficient and that the additional inspection, if reasonably required, would
probably have discovered the object. This the plaintiff failed to do.

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

"A detailed review of the numerous cases cited
by plaintiff is unnecessary. We have carefully examined and find them not inconsistent with our
conclusion here. Most of the cases cited involved
dangerous conditions created by the employer himself. In others there was evidence that he had
knowledge, actual or constructive, of the specific
object which caused the injury. In many of the cases
cited, the defect was shown to have existed for a considerable period of time prior to the injury. But the
defect was by nature permanent in character so that
the inference of continuity to the time of the accident would be justified.
"The judgment is reversed. The cause is remanded to the circuit court with directions to enter
judgment for the defendant."
It seems clear that the precise argument now urged by
the plaintiff on the theory that the defendant had failed
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to exercise reasonable care to furnish a safe place to work
was presented to the Oregon court. This theory was very
thoroughly examined and it was held that a fatal d~fect
existed in the plaintiff's case, i. e., plaintiff had failed to
show that the defendant had notice, either actual or constructive, of the dangerous condition which had been caused
by the conduct of third persons. The identical situation is
presented in the case at bar. The plaintiff has not even attempted to show that the defendant had actual notice of
the impaired clearance which was. created by the baggage
trucks against which Mr. Butz was carried. This condition
of impaired clearance was a fleeting situation which the
evidence showed might have existed for less than five
minutes prior to the time of the accident. It was therefore
legally impossible for the jury reasonably to find that the
defendant had constructive notice of the condition of the
premises and it must therefore inevitably follow that plaintiff had failed to prove that the defendant negligently
breached its duty to exercise reasonable care to furnish
him a reasonably safe place to work. This conclusion is
strengthened by the further fact that the evidence ·in the
case at bar demonstrated beyond question that the defendant had taken reasonable precautions to prevent an
accident such as the accident which occurred by stationing
the plaintiff at the point of the moving cut of cars for the
express purpose of keeping a lookout ahead for any
dangerous situation.
In the ·case of Schilling v. Delaware & H. R. Corp.,
114 Fed. (2d) 69, the Circuit Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit announced the same doctrine as the basis for
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its decision in that case. It there appeare_d that the plaintiff had been injured while working as a switchman when
struck by a moving car. The reason for his having been
struck by the car was the fact that his foot was caught in
a gap in a tie so that he was unable to get out of the way
of the car. Mr. Justice Chase speaking for the court said:
"It was, of course, the duty of the defendant to
provide a safe place for the plaintiff to work and such
a space in the tie as that in which he caught his foot
made it unsafe. Yet proof of that is not alone enough
to charge the defendant with liability. It was shown
that in· the ordinary course of the work the cinder
filling in the ties did get washed out and the duty of
the defendant of necessity was one of adequate inspection and timely repair. There is nothing to indicate that the daily inspection provided was not
equal to what a prudent man in like circumstances
would have done except possibly the testimony by
deposition of one trainman in the crew in which the
plaintiff worked who came on duty at 4 o'clock that
afternoon and testified when asked if he looked at
the hole more than once: 'I noticed it all day. It
was there before.' He did not report it or state any
more definitely the length of time it had been there.
As his day began at 4 o'clock that afternoon there
was little on which the jury could have found that
the hole had been there long enough to charge the
defendant with constructive notice and the duty to
repair. Proof of actual notice was wholly lacking.
One or the other must appear to make out actionable
negligence for failure to repair."
In the Schilling case the court held that there was
sufficient evidence of notice to the defendant of the dangerous condition which existed to present a jury question
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thereon. But, in the case at bar, there is no evidence indicating either that the defendant knew or should have
known of the impaired clearance which existed at the
place Butz '\Vas injured.
In the case of ~Iatthews v. Southern Pacific Co., 59
P. (2d) 2-20, the plaintiff was injured while attempting to
throw a switch. The injury was attributable to a loose nut
which was found lying in the switch after the accident,
which had made it impossible to throw the switch in the
usual manner. The plaintiff claimed that this nut had
rendered his place of work unsafe and that his employer
was consequently liable under the Federal Empl~yers·
Liability Act. In denying the plaintiff recovery the California court made the following observations :
''It is conceded that defendant owed plaintiff
the duty of providing a reasonably safe place in
which to work. It is also firmly established by a
great preponderance of authority that, where an
otherwise safe place to work had been rendered dangerous to an employee by an object falling on railroad tracks, or a hole or depression existing along
the tracks, the plaintif must prove actual .or constructive notice of the condition to the employer
before he can recover damages.
"The case of Fr~bes v. Michigan Cent. R. Co.,
218 Mich. 367, 188 N. W. 424, 425, is of persuasive
force. In that ease plaintiff was injured when a
switch engine on which he was riding was derailed
by an iron knuckle in a switch frog. In holding
that the plaintif could not recover because no negligence was pro~en, the court said: 'We have gone
over this somewhat lengthy record with great care.
We do not find in it any evidence of negligence on
the part of the defendant.- We agree with the trial
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judge when he said: 'The engine was derailed, and
I assume that it was derailed because this knuckle
was in this frog; it has not been shown that a single
person in the employ of the defendant railroad company knew that that knuckle was there until a few
seconds before the injury. Nothing has been shown
by which the jury could infer, in my judgment, that
by reasonable inspection the knuckle could have been
observed in time to have averted the accident to the
the plaintiff. 'There is nothing in the case, as I have
already said, that indicates that the defendant was
not performing its full duty with reference to inspection, and we all know the fundamental rules
with respect to the duty of an employer to inspect.
It is fundamental that there must be either actual
or constructive notice of the danger, and a reasonable opportunity given to the employer to remove it,
before he can be charged with actionable negligence.
I do not believe, gentlemen, that this case can go
to the jury on the subject of the alleged negligence
of the defendant, because in some way or other this
knuckle got into ·this frog on this particular occasion'.'

*

*

*

*

*

"It seems to be the established rule that in
cases of this kind the railroad company should have
either actual or constructive notice of the dangerous
condition and that such condition must be shown
to have existed for a sufficient time to permit its
discovery and correction by the use of ordinary
care.''
The principle established by the foregoing cases is announced and reiterated in numerous other decisions and
the law seems to be well settled in this regard. To cite additional opinions would serve no useful purpose on a matter
so elementary as the subject under discussion. We have
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chosen the cases set forth above as illustrative of a simple ·
doctrine universally recognized by the courts of this country. It seems to us that the application of the principle to
the case at bar is equally clear. Now here in the record is
there any evidence remotely suggestive of proof that the
defendant had left the trucks in the position where they
were found at the time of the accident, or that it had actual
notice thereof, or that they had been i~ that position creating impaired clearance for a period of time long enough so
that the defendant might legally be said to have constructive notice thereof. In fact, it appears from a reading of
the record that the plaintiff made no effort to establish his
case by proof of negligence on the part of the defendant
on any theory other than his theory that the negligence of
the employes of the Denver Union Terminal Company is
imputable to the Union Pacific. We therefore respectfully
submit that the plaintiff's case was insufficient to go to the
jury on any theory of negligence on the part of the Union
Pacific itself and that the plaintiff's contention in this regard is an afterthought brought into the case for the first
time on this appeal, and that the same is without merit.
We shall therefore proceed to an analysis of the contention which the plaintif urged at the time of trial, i. e.,
that the Union Pacific Railroad Company is responsible for
negligence of employes of a third party. This argument is
designated in the plaintiff's brief as Point No. I, subsection
(a), and is stated by the plaintiff as follows:
"Where an employee is· sent on the premises of
another to work side by side with employees of another and suffers injury by reason of an unsafe
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condition created by the negligence of the owner of
the premises or the owner's servants, such negligence is imputed to and becomes that of the employer."
In an attempt to induce the court to adopt this novel
and revolutionary theory of negligence imputed from one
person to another, with no legal basis therefor, the plaintiff's attorneys have cited an amazing number of cases
which do not, in fact, support his proposition at all. An
examination of the principle which plaintiff seeks to have
this court pronounce demonstrates the fallacy of plaintiff's
position independently of the consideration of the cases
upon which he relies. At the commence:ment of our consideration of this matter we request the court to observe
that nowhere in the record or in the plaintiff's brief is there
evidence or even an argument to the effect that there is
any identity between the Union Pacific Railroad Company
and the Denver Union Terminal ·Company. The fact is to
the contrary. These two companies are absolutely separate
corporations and the Terminal ·Company is not even a subsidiary of the defendant. There is no support for plaintiff's contentions to be found in any peculiar relationship
between the defendant and the Denver Union Terminal
Company. It is simply a question as to whether or not the
negligence of the employes of the Terminal Company is
legally chargeable to the Union Pacific because of the
fact that the Union Pacific performed work in the same
area where the employes of the 'T'erminal 'Company worked.
We concede that the duty of the employer to exercise reasonable care to furnish a reasonably safe place to work has
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been held to extend to the situation '\Vhere the employer
sends his employe onto the premises of another; and we
also concede that in many instances such employer has been·
held responsible for injuries received by his employe while
on the premises of another due to a dangerous condition
of the premises created by negligence of the servants of the
owner of the premises. But the liability which is imposed
in these cases is based upon the negligence of the employer
and is not grounded upon any imputation of the negligence
of the servants of the owner of the premises to the employer; and in those instances where liability is imposed
on the employer the only real basis for imposing the liability lies in the negligence of the employer himself in exposing his servant to the danger with-knowledge thereof, either
actual or constructive. That the legal basis for imposing
liability in any such case is to be found in the negligence
of the employer, rather than by imputation of th~ negligence of the servants of the owner of the premises to the
employer, is demonstrated by the fact that in those cases
. where the employer is not guilty of negligence for the
reason that he had neither actual nor constructive notice
of the dangerous conditions of the premises, created by the
servants of the owner thereof, no liability is imposed.
The Waller case, cited supra, is typical of the holdings
in this regard. It seems clear that the court held in the
Waller case that the defendant was not chargeable with
the acts of those persons unloading the cars because of the
fact that there was no relationship of master and: servant
between such persons and the defendant. Therefore, in deciding whether or not the defendant was liable, the court
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went on to consider the possible negligence of the defendant upon the theory that it should have known of the dangerous condition created by the conduct of strangers to
the lawsuit.
In the case of Williams v. Terminal Railroad Ass'n of
St. Louis, et al., 20 S. W. (2d) 584, the Missouri court explained the distinction which exists in cases such as the
case at bar. In that case the plaintiff was a baggage and
mail handler in the employ of the defendant under the
supervision of a foreman named Kli:tJ.e. On the date of the
accident the American Railway Express Company, through
its employes, had left an ex:press truck in a position on the
platform in Fhe yards of the defendant so that the clearance was impaired and so that a person on the side of a
railroad car being moved along the track would strike
against the baggage truck. The plaintiff was ordered by
his foreman to board the train as. it proceeded along this
.track at a slow rate of speed. He had succeeded in taking
hold of the grabiron on one of the cars and had swung his
feet into the stirrup when his back struck against the express truck and he was knocked to the ground and severely
injured. The Missouri court said :
"For its principal point, defendant ·contends
that its requested peremptory instruction in the
nature of a demurrer to all the evidence should have
been given, upon the theory that there was no evidence that it knew, or in the exercise of ordinary
care could have known, of the presence of the truck
in dangerous proximity to the train before the order
was given. It argues that the truck was placed upon
the platform by its owner, the American Railway
Express Company, about which there seems to be
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no dispute, and that, inasmuch as the danger resulted from the act of a third party, it may not be
held liable for the ensuing damage unless the proof
shows either that its foreman or other responsible
agent actually knew of the truck's presence alongside the track, or else that the truck had been so
situated long enough to have charged defendant with
constructive knowledge of its location.
"We have no fault to find with defendant's
staten1ent of the general rule of law which is said
to govern the controversy at hand, and we further
agree with it that there was no showing of the duration of time that the truck had been left standing on
the platform; but for reasons which we shall presently state, we cannot accept its position as to the
insufficiency of the evidence to show constructive
knowledge of the truck's presence on the part of its
foreman before he gave the order to plaintiff to
board the train."
In the WiUiams case the court held that there was sufficient evidence that the defendant had constructive notice
of the dangerous condition in that the foreman Kline ought
to have known thereof, but it is clear from the opinion that
in the absence of such notice no liability would have been
imposed upon the defendant. We believe that this case is
as squarely in point as any case which could possibly be
discovered on the matter in dispute and that the opinion
correctly points out the proper basis for any liability which
might be imposed upon the employing defendent, i. e., that
inasmuch as the defendant had constructive knowledge of
the condition which existed as a cause of the accident there
was a jury question on the matter of the defendant's negligence.
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The rule is stated as follows 1n the American Law
Institute Restatement of the Law of Agency, paragraph
504:
"The master's duty as to working conditions
does not extend to the condition of premises not in
his control nor to the conduct of third persons with
whom the servants are to be brought into contact
during the course of the work, except that he has
a duty to disclose dangerous conditions of which he
should know.''
In the case of Manning v. Sherman, 86 Atl. 245, decided by the Supreme Court of Maine, the applicable doctrine was stated in a case involving the liability of the
owner of the premises to an invitee. The language used by
the court was as follows:
"This principle is well stated in these words:
'When the injury is the result solely of the negligent
act of a third person, who does not stand in such a
relation to the defendant as to render the doctrine of
respondeat superior applicable, no liability attaches
to defendant. The fact that the negligent act which
caused the injury was done on a person's land or
property will not render him liable, where he had no
control over the persons committing such act, and the
act was. not committed on his account, nor where the
third person, whose negligence caused the injury, assumes control of the owner's property without authority.. An owner or occupant of premises, not in a defective or dangerous condition, is not liable for injuries caus.ed by acts of third persons, which were
unauthorized, or which he had no reason to anticipate and of which he had no knowledge.' "
In the case of Small v. Ralston-Purina Co. Inc., 202
S. W. (2d) 533, decided by a Missouri court in 1947, the
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doctrine was explained further. In that case the plaintiff
was employed by the Terminal Railroad Association of St.
Louis. He went upon the premises of the Ralston-Purina
Company for the purpose of inspecting a car of the defendant which \Vas on a track on the Ralston-Purina premises.
While on the premises he stepped on a board lying by the
side of the car, causing him to fall and suffer the injuries
for which suit '\Vas brought. In holding that the employer,
Terminal Railroad Association of St. Louis, was not liable,
the court said :
"There is no evidence whatever in this case as
to who placed the board alongside the railroad track;
there is certainly no proof whatever that the T'erminal or any of its employees placed the board "lnhere
it was found, or knew that it was there. There could
be no inference that the board was placed there by
the Terminal, it not being the occupier or owner or
in charge of the premises. The premises belonged to
and were occupied by Ralston and the only connection Terminal had with the premises, so far as the
evidence goes, was to push or shunt cars into Ralston's premises, and take therefrom loaded cars.
Under such circumstances T'erminal may not be held
liable in the absence of proof that it actually knew
that the board was there and created a dangerous
condition, or that !t had been there long enough to
have charged T·erminal with constructive knowledge,
and so knowing failed to instruct or warn whether
the board had been there one minute, one hour or
one day. The law is established that in order torequire an employer to warn and instruct the employee,
the danger must be one known to the employer and
unknown to the employee. In no event was there any
liability established on the part of T·erminal for failure to provide its servant with a safe place to work,
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or failure to warn him of an unsafe condition, and
hence its motion for a directed verdict should have
been sustained."
In the case of Texarkana & Ft. S. Ry. Co. v. La Velle,
260 S. W. 248, the Texas court stated the matter in the
following language :
"In view of the special circumstances shown
in this case, it is concluded that negligence on the
part of the railway company cannot be legally predicated upon the fi:rst ground, as charged by the court,
that it 'negligently permitted to be placed the said
skid in its position of close proximity to said car,'
for it conclusively appears that the skid poles were
in the position existing in virtue of the progress of
the work of the Veneer Works' employees of unloading logs. They failed to remove the skid poles after
unloading the cars and before they quit work for the
day of January 14th, and there is no pretense or suggestion in the evidence that any employee of the railway company placed them in that position. The fact
alone that the appellant knew of and licensed the
use of skid poles in unloading cars would not make·
it absolutely responsible in this case for this. particular occurrence. It is undisputed that the railway
.company had no control or authority over the employees of the Veneer Works, or the instrumentalities they used, or the manner in which they used
them in unloading logs. The skid poles were necessary and proper instrumentalities with which to unload logs from cars, and as long as they were properly used in a manner or way or at a time not calculated to do injury to the premises or employees of
the railway company, it had no legal right to interfere and prevent their use on its cars. The duty and
right of the railway company to interefere would
only arise when the skid poles were untimely left
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remaining in a place or position to be a dangerous
obstruction on its premises, too near its track or
passing cars for the safety of its employees. And
clearly the railway company on this particular occasion \Vas not called upon 'to prevent' the 'placing'
of the skid poles for the purpose of unloading logs ;
for in the circumstances the appellant had no reasonable ground to anticipate that the employees of
the Veneer Works would do the very act on this
special occasion of leaving the skid poles so near
the cars. It is a plain and well-established rule of
la'v that a railway company, like any other, is not
liable for injuries caused solely by the act of strangers putting a temporary obstruction on or dangerously near its· premises, unless it also is guilty of
negligence. Railway Co. v. Jones, 103 Tex. 187, 125
s. w. 309.
"The error necessitates a reversal of the judgment, since the submission to the jury of any erroneous ground of recovery is prejudicial and not harmless erro~. Lancaster v. Fitch, 112 T'ex. 293, 24.6 S.
w. 1015.
"It is believed that it cannot be said that there
is an insufficiency of evidence to pass to the jury the
question of wl).ether or not there was negligence on
the part of appellant in 'permitting said skid toremain in its position of close proximity to said car.'
'The liability of appellant to appellee would be measured by whether or not the skid pole continued in
the position of protruding over on its premises in
dangerous proximity to the passing car untimely
enough to impute negligent failure to know it was
there in that position. Railway Co. v. La Velie, (Tex.
Civ. App.) 247 S. W. 617. For negligent ignorance
has the same effect in law in charging the employer
with liability as actual knowledge."
The Supreme Court of the United States in the case of
Lillie v. Thompson, 332 U. S. 459, 68 S. ~Ct. 140, predicated
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the liability on the same theory. 'This case, which is cited
by the plaintiff in his brief, states the rule as follows:
"We are of the opinion that the allegations in
the complaint, if supported by evidence, will warrant
submission to a jury. Petitioner alleged in effect
that respondent was aware of conditions which created a likelihood that a young woman performing
the duties required of petitioner would suffer just
such an injury as was in fact inflicted upon her. That
the foreseeable danger was from intentional or criminal misconduct is irrelevant; respondent nonetheless had a duty to make reasonable provision against
it. Breach of that duty would be negligence, and we
cannot say as a matter of law that petitioner's injury
did not result at least in part from such negligence."
It would seem so obvious as to require no comment that
the Supreme Court of the United States placed the liability
against the railroad company in the Lillie case on the
theory that the railroad company was negligent in that it
had knowledge of the dangerous condition of the premises
to which it had assigned the plaintiff to work. The liability appears to have been squarely placed upon the fact that
respondent was aware of the danger.
In the analogous situation presented to this court in
the case of Lasagna v. McCarthy, supra, Justice Latimer,
speaking for the court, quoted with approval from the case
of Hardy v. Shedden Co., Ltd., 78 Fed. 610, as follows:

" '* * *

But where, in the course of the employment, the acts of third persons, not employed by
the master, may increase the danger of the service,
and these acts and their character are under the eye
of the servant, and, to the servant's knowledge, are
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not under the supervision of the master, we do not
think the master is liable if injury results to the servant from the negligence of the third persons * * *.
Where the servant has greater opportunity than the
master to know and observe the probable results
from the acts of the third person, of which the master, to the knowledge of the servant, has had no
opportunity to judge, then it is unreasonable to hold
that, with respect to such acts, the master has any
obligation to the servant * * *.'"
Plainly, the statement given above would be incorrect
if the proper basis for fixing liability upon the employer
was negligence of a third person imputed to the employer
by virtue of the fact that such third person was working
in the same area as the employer's servants.
For the most part the cases cited by the plaintiff obviously recognize the distinction above mentioned. In the
case of ..4.lbert Miller & Co. v. Wilkins, 209 Fed. 582, cited
by the plaintiff at page 12 of his brief, it appeared that
the defect in the derrick causing plaintiff's injuries should
have been discovered by the plaintiff's employer. The court
said, respecting the matter of liability:
"Miller & Company were not excused from the
duty of providing a safe place and safe appliances.
They had full opportunity to satisfy themselves that
the premises and appliances were in good and safe
condition."
The court went on to hold in effect that the basis of
liability in that case was the negligence of the employer
himself in requiring the plaintiff to work on appliances and
at a place which the employer knew, or should have known,
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to be defective. There is no suggestion that the negligence
of the owner of the derrick or of his employes is legally
imputable to the defendant.
The decision in the case· of Porter v. Terminal R. Ass'n.,
cited by plaintiff at page 13 of his brief, is only explainable
on the theory of negligence on the part of the employer itself. In that case the accident was caused by a heavy growth
of weeds along a track making it impossible to see a derailer
on the track. In this case the presence of the weeds cannot
fairly be said to be a fleeting or transitory thing. 'The condition, in common sense, must have existed for such a period
of time that the defendant was charged with constructive
notice thereof. Thus it was possible for the jury to find
that there was an actual breach of duty on the part of the
defendant itself.
In the case of Ryan v. Twin Cities Wholesale Grocer
Co., cited by plaintiff at page 14 of his brief, the court announced the rule that when the- defendant railroad sent the
plaintiff, its employe, to the premises of the grocery company to work under a semi-permanent arrangement it remained the duty of the railroad company to use ordinary
care to see that plaintiff had a reasonably safe place wherein to work. There was evidence in this case that the manner
of stacking sugar in the grocery company's warehouse was
faulty, resulting in injury to the plaintiff. In this case it
was the negligence of the· railroad in req~iring the plaintiff to work in an unsafe place which fixed liability and
the negligence of the agents or servants of the owner of
the premises was not imputed to the railroad company.
From all that appears in the opinion the explanation of the
I
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case may well lie in the fact that the more or less permanent and defective method of stacking the sugar was within \
the constructive knowledge of the railroad company. If this
is not the real basis of the opinion, then we respectfully submit that the decision is erroneous and in conflict with the
almost unanimous weight of authority as we have been
able to discover the cases dealing with this problem.
The case of Wegman v. Great Northern Ry. Co., cited
by plaintiff at page 16 of his brief, is not authority for the
proposition which he urges_ as a review of the facts will
disclose. In this case the plaintiff was injured on the defendant's property while in the employ of the defendant,
due to the negligence of a licensee permitted by the defendant to use its propery. Here the conduct of the licensee
while upon the property of the defendant railroad was within the control of the defendant, furnishing a different basis
upon which the court relied for the result which it reached.
In the case of Lovett v. Calloway, 69 Fed. Supp. 532,
cited by the plaintiff at page 17 of his brief, the plaintiff's
intestate was killed as the result of the negligence of a
person operating an engine in ~the defendant's yards. The
court held that while operating this- engine within the de'
fendant's yards ·this employe was an agent of the defendant
and therefore imputed his negligence to the defendant on
the theory of respondeat superior. In so doing the court
said:
"This case hinges, therefore, on the question of
whether the employee of the Sandersville Railroad
Company, whose act caused the death of plaintiff's
husband, was, in the circumstances alleged, also an
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employee or agent of defendant within the meaning
of such words as employed in the Federal Employers'
Liability Act."
The distinction between this case and the case at bar
is obvious. In the case before this court there is no evidence which would justify the ·conclusion that the employes
of the Railway Express Agency who handled these baggage
trucks were employes or agents of the Union Pacific Railroad Company.
In the case of Ellis v. Union Pacific R. Co., cited by
plaintiff at page 18 of his brief, it is not even remotely
.suggested that the negligence of a third party should be
imputed to the defendant. The sole question decided by the
Supreme Court of the United States was a determination as
to whether or not the plaintiff had made a jury question on
negligence· of the defendant itself in maintaining a track in
too close proximity to a building. There is not the slightest
;hint in the language used by the court indicating that
liability could be predicated upon imputation of negligent
·conduct of those who constructed the building near the
tracks.
In the case of Schlueter v. East St. Louis Connecting
Ry. Co., 296 S. W. 105, cited by plaintiff at page 20 of his
brief, the plaintiff had alleged that the dangerous condition
of the track was known, or by the exercise of ordinary care
could and should have been known, by the defendants and
their officers and agents in time to have prevented plaintiff's injuries by the exercise of ordinary care. The court
sustained a verdict for the plaintiff after determining that
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there was ample evidence to support a finding that the defendant knew or should have known of· the defective condition of the track. The court said :
"As we have said there is substantial evidence
in the record that the defective condition of track
No. 1 had existed for at least a year prior to the derailment, and that several engineers in appellant's
employment had observed the condition of the track
* * *. But assuming that the evidence is insufficient to show actual knowledge of the defective
condition of track No. 1 by the appellant and its
trainmaster, yet we think the evidence is sufficient
to establish constructive knowledge of such condition
on their part; or, otherwise expressed, we think that
the evidence establishes the fact that appellant and
its trainmaster should, or could, by the exercise of
ordinary care, have known of such defective condition of the track."
It is difficult to see any reason for the necessity of this
discussion if the negligence of the owner of the track in
permitting the dangerous condition to exist was legally
imputable to the railroad company who employed the plaintiff. The basis of liability in this case is plainly to be found
in the negligence of the employer in sending its employe to
work in a place which it should have known was not safe.
The court fixed liability on this basis and not on any theory
that the negligence of the owner of the track was imputable
to the defendant.
The Ford case cited in plaintiff's brief at page 21 involved a post creating impaired clearance on a track. This
post was, of course, a relatively permanent object so that
constructive notice of the impaired clearance was chargeable to the
. defendant.
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In the Kanawha case, cited at page 2·2 of plaintiff's
brief, the Supreme Court of the United States said:
"T'he evidence that the timber had been in the
position described for a considerable period of time
was presumptive evidence of notice to the company;
besides which, the switch engineer and conductor
both testified to actual knowledge on their part, prior
to the time of the accident to Barry."
In the D'oyle case, cited in the Schlueter case and in
plaintiff's brief at page 23, it appeared that a roof over a
track on property owned by a third party fell, injuring the
plaintiff while he was working for the defendant on the
track. The court determined that the evidence showed the
building to be improperly constructed, and further, "that
its condition was apparent to anyone who would examine
it." Again, the condition was of permanent nature so that
the defendant was chargeable with constructive notice of
the dangerous place of work.
In Stetler v. Railway Co., 46· Wis. 497, cited by plaintiff at page 23 of his brief, the court said:
"The evidence tends to show that some of the
officers of the defendant had some k~owledge that
this side track was not at the time in a very safe
condition, and that the conductor of the train upon
which the plaintiff was employed at the time of the
accident was cautioned by the train dispatcher when
sent out to run over such track, to run slow."
There would be no necessity for any mention of this
phase of the case if the basis of liability was the imputation
of negligence from the third party who owned the track
directly to the railroad company..

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

35
In the case of Wisconsin Central Railroad Co. v.
Ross, cited at page 24 of plaintiff's brief, the negligence
upon which liability was based was that of the railroad
company in failing to discover a defect in tracks owned by
a third party that the railroad company should have discovered.
In the case of Terminal R. Ass'n. of St. Louis v. Fitzjohn, ~ited at page 25 of plaintiff's brief, the jury found
that the defendant employer was negligent in sending the
plaintiff to work on Government property where permanent projections from a building extended to within six
inches of the track thus rendering the clearance dangerously
close. The permanency of the condition justified a finding
that the defendant knew, or should have known, of the unsafe condition. To fix liability in this type of case is not
the same as to fix liability in a case such as the Butz case
where there was no evidence of knowledge, either constructive or actual, on the part of the defendant as to the dangerous condition which existed.
In the Floody case, cited at page 26 of plaintiff's brief,
the court held that the defendant railroad company had
arranged with a third party, the Union Depot Company at
Omaha, whereby Union Depot Company switchmen would
perform work for and under the supervision and control
of the defendant railroad. The defendant was held to be
responsible for negligent conduct of these switchmen because the switchmen were in law the agents of the defendant.
At page 28 of his brief the plaintiff cities a great number of cases, none of which are in reality helpful to his
cause.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

36
.. In any of these cases which even remotely approach the
problem presented in the case at bar it is clear that liability,
if imposed, is based on negligence of the employing defendant and not ~pon any imputation of negligence from third
persons to such employing defendant. In all of the cases
where liability was fixed upon the employing defendant
knowledge, either actual or constructive, on the part of the
defendant that the premises or machinery used were unsafe
·
existed.
T'o go through every case cited by plaintiff fact by
fact would unduly extend and prolong this discussion.
Suffice it to say that most, if not all, of the cases cited by
plaintiff appear to rest any liability squarely on the negligence of the employer himself in sending his employe to a
place which the employer knew, or should have known, to
be dangerous ; and in no case cited by plaintiff does the
statement appear that the negligence of strangers is imputable to the employer merely because he has sent his
employe to the premises of such stranger.
To adopt the rule contended for by plaintiff is to depart
from the concept of liability based on fault and to accept
in ·place thereof a doctrine that the employer is an insurer
of the safety of his employes when working on the premises
of another. This is contrary to the mandate of the Supreme
Court of the United States as set forth in the Ellis case,
cited supra, and in the case of Bailey v. Central Vermont
Railway, 319 U. S. 350, 63 S. Ct. 1062, 87 L. Ed. 1444,
where the court said:
"Sec. 1 of the Act makes the carrier liable in
damages for any injury or death 'resulting in whole
or in part from the negligence' of any of its 'officers,
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agents, or employees.' The rights which the Act
creates are federal rights protected by federal rather
than local rules of la,v. r'\.nd those federal rules have
been largely fashioned from the common law except
as Congress has written into the Act different standards. At common law the duty of the employer to
use reasonable care in furnishing his employees with
a safe place to work 'vas plain. That rule is deeply
engrained in federal jurisprudence. ('Citing cases.)
As stated by this Court in the Patton case, it is a
duty which becomes 'more imperative' as the risk
increases. 'Reasonable care becomes then a demand
of higher supremacy, and yet in all cases it is a ques-:tion of the reasonableness of the care--reasonableness depending upon the danger attending the place
or the machinery.' It is that rule which obtains under the Employers' Liability Act."
In concluding our examination of plaintiff's contention
on imputed negligence it might be well briefly to examine the
general law as to imputed negligence. The following brief
statement of the court in Buttrick v. Pacific Electric Ry. Co.,
260 P. 588, summarizes the law:
"In order that the negligence of one person may
be imputed to another, the two must stand in such
relation of privity that the doctrine of qui facit per:
alium facit per se directly applies."
There is no evidence of such a relationship in the case
at bar.
We res·pectfully submit that the plaintiff failed in his
proof that defendant was guilty of negligence and that
consequently the decision of the trial court in holding as a
matter of law that defendant was not negligent, was proper.
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POINT II
THE TRIAL ·COURT CORRE·CTLY HELD AS A
MATTER OF LAW THAT PLAINTTFF''S CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE WAS THE SOLE PROXIMAT'E
CAUSE OF HIS INJURIES.
Any consideration of plaintiff's Point II becomes important only if it be determined that plaintiff's first assignment of error is well taken. Unless negligence on the part
of the defendant is shown, it is improper to inquire into
the consequences· of plaintiff's contributory negligence.
Solely for the purpose of treating the matter of causation,
we herewith concede that the plaintiff made a jury question
on the subject of the defendant's negligence. We respectfully submit that even though we ·concede the fact of defendant's negligence, nevertheless the court's judgment
should be affirmed fJ>r the reason that such negligence was
not the cause of plaintiff's injuries. It appears clear that
the sole proximate cause of the accident and resulting injuries was the negligence of the plaintiff himself.
Plaintiff· was assigned to ride the point of the lead car
on the movement when he was injured. He was placed in
this position for the express purpose of guarding against
dangers arising from obstacles fouling the track or so close
thereto as to create a dangerous situation. His primary
function, duty and responsibility was to prevent the occurrence of the very thing that happened on this occasion.
The accident resulted solely from his failure to perform
that positive duty properly.
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When an employe's primary duty is to repair a dangerous instrumentality or prevent the operation of an unsafe condition, he cannot recover for injuries resulting
from his negligent failure to do so. Goins v. North Jellico
Coal Co., 131 S. W. 28 (Kentucky) ; Moquin v. Minneapolis,
St. P. & S. S. M. Ry. Co., 231 N. W. 829 (Minnesota);
Probst v. Heisinger Motor Co., 16 S. W. (2d) 1005
(Missouri) .

Blunt v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 9 Fed. (2d) 395, decided
by the United States Circuit Court of Appeals, Sixth ·C-ircuit,
is a case illustrating the rule, and we quote the short per
curiam decision verbatim:
"This is an action under the Employers' Liability Act (Comp. St. Sees. 8657-8665) to recover damages for injuries received by plaintiff, a crossing
watchman, who was struck by a truck which was
thrown from the track of defendant by collision with
a fast passenger train. The collision occurred at the
intersection of defendant's tracks with a public street,
at which intersection plaintiff was stationed as a
watchman to warn persons using the street of the
approach of trains. There was evidence tending to
show that the train was running at a rapid rate of
speed and no signal of its approach to the crossing
was given. The afternoon was rainy and dark. There
was a shanty provided by the company for its watchman adjacent to the crossing. Prior to the accideiJ.t
plaintiff had gone into the shanty. He remained
there until the train was practically on the crossing.
Upon hearing the rumbling of the train he rushed
out and was struck by the truck as it was hurled
from the crossing.
"At the conclusion of the plaintiff's evidence the
trial court directed the jury to return a verdict for
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the defendant. We think the ruling was correct. It
was the personal duty of plaintiff to keep a lookout
at the crossing, and to warn those about to use it of
any trains that were approaching. The performance
of this duty necessarily required that he discover the
train in time· to protect himself and warn others.
The evidence shows that, owing to weather conditions, he could not see the train from inside the
shanty, but, if he had remained outside, could have
seen it in time to have warned the driver and prevented the collision. He had no right to use the
shanty, except as he could do so consistently with
his. duty as watchman. It was his failure to perform
this paramount duty t~t was the sole proximate
cause of the collision. Frese v. C., B. & Q. R. R. Co.,
263 U. S.l, 44 S. Ct. 1, 68 L. Ed. 131; Davis, Agent
v. Kennedy, Adm'x, 266 U. S. 147, 45 S. Ct. 3'3·, 69
. L~ Ed. 212·.
"Judgment affirmed."
See also Southern Ry. Co. v. Hylton, 37 Fed. (2d) 843,
and cases cited therein, and the report of the rehearing of
this case found in 87 Fed. (2d) at p. 393, for illustrations
of' the same rule. See. also Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Davis,
75 Fed. (2d) 849.
In Pere Marquette Ry. Co. v. Hoskins, 62 Fed. (2d)
806, plaintiff, a conductor, was injured when he ran his
train into an open switch of which he had notice. After
conceding defendant was negligent in leaving the switch
open,' the court said :

"The question, therefore, is one of causal relation. Long ago, in McAlmont v. Pennsylvania R. Co.,
283· Fed. 736, this court, following Great Northern
Ry. Co. v. Wiles, .240 U. S. 444, 36 S. Ct. 406, 60 L.
Ed. 73~, pointed out that even in the presence of the
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defendant's negligence in setting in motion the train
of events without which the injury would not have
happened, the plaintiff's own conduct may be such
as to become the sole proximate cause of the injury.

*
*
*
*
"* * * He (plaintiff) was in a position
where he could safely operate the train or, by disobeying orders, so operate it as to cause an accident.
It was his act in operating it in the latter manner
that was the sole proximate cause of his injuries

* * *"
I

1

See also Hanson v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co., 88 P.
(2d) 348 (Okla.), for an excellent statement of the chain
of causation broken by plaintiff's own negligence.

Coray v. Southern Pacific Co., cited by plaintiff in his
brief, is not inconsistent with the rule announced in these
cases. Aside from the fact that the liability of the defendant in the Coray case was based on a violation of the Safety
Appliance Act it also appears that the nature of the plaintiff's negligence in that case was quite different from the
negligence in the cases cited above and in the case at bar.
His negligence was such as might have been foreseeable.
No special precaution was taken to avoid injury resulting
from the violation of the Safety Appliance Act in that
case. In the case at bar, as in the cases cited above, plaintiff
was injured because of an occurrence which the plaintiff
himself owed a primary duty to avoid. It was the primary
duty of Butz to discover the unsafe condition which existed
and to prevent injury therefro~. His negligent failure so
to do was an intervening negligence which was the sole
proximate cause of his injuries.
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POINT III
THE TRIAL ·COURT DID NOT DEPRIVE THE
PLAINTIFF OF HIS RIGHT T'O TRIAL B:Y JURY.
By his third point the plaintiff urges that the trial
court was in error in that it deprived plaintiff of his right
~f trial by jury. In support of this proposition plaintiff
cites numerous statements of the Supreme ·Court of the
United Srtates and other courts to the effect that a jury
trial is a fundamental part of the employe's rights under
the Federal Employers' Liability Act. Plaintiff's brief contains further statements of the Supreme Court of the
United States and others to the effect that in close and
doubtful cases disputed issues of fact should be submitted
to juries for their determination. In view of the numerous
Federal Employers' Liability Act cases which this court
has been called upon to consider during the tenure of the
present members of the court, it would be an idle ceremony
to cite a great number of cases on the scope of the jury's
function in the trial of cases under the Federal Employers'
Liability Act. But we have yet to see any case, and plaintiff has cited none, which indicates that the right of trial
by jury is any more fundamental to a suit under the Federal
Employers' Liability Act than to any other action at law
wherein the right to trial by jury is guaranteed by the
constitution of the United States or the State of Utah or
of any other State. Generalized statements that plaintiff
is entitled to trial by jury will not help this court in the
solution of the ·case at bar.
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Mr. Justice Wolfe, in the case of Raymond v. Union
Pacific Ra'il'road Co., 191 P. (2d) 137, ... Utah ... , answered the argument presented by this portion of plaintiff's brief, as follows :

I

"It has been strenuously argued by plaintiff
that this decision has deprived him of his constitutional right to a jury trial. That contention has been
urged upon this court in almost every case of nonsuit
and directed verdict brought before us. This court
is charged with the duty of protecting all of the
rights of all litigants. This is especially true of those
fundamental rights guaranteed by the State and Federal Constitutions. But the right to have a jury pass
upon issues of fact does not include the right to have
a cause submitted to a jury in the hope of a verdict
where the facts undisputably show that the plain,;.
tiff is not entitled to relief.
"It may be regretted that there is no federal
workmen's compensation act, similar to those which
have been adopted in nearly all of the states,· so that
a workman injured in an industrial accident, such
as plaintiff here, might have recourse to some remedy for his injury. But that is a matter to be corrected by the Congress, and not by us. So long as
liability is dependent upon proof of fault on the part
of defendant, and freedom from fault on the part of
plaintiff, 'it is not for this Court to torture and twist
the law of negligence so as to make it in result a
law ·not of liability for fault but a law of liability for
injuries.' See the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice
Frankfurter in the recent case of Johnson v. U. S.
68 S. Ct. 391, 396."
If, in fact, plaintiff failed to make a question of fact as
to the defendant's negligence, as we believe demonstrated
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by the foregoing authorities, or if the evidence which he
hi~self

offered shows the sole proximate cause of his in-

juries to have been his own negligent conduct, then the
right to trial by jury, which was vested in the defendant
equally with the plaintiff, required the trial court to direct
a verdict of non-liability or to dismiss the plaintiff's case
on motion for a nonsuit.
Trial by jury involves more than submission of. every
case to eight citizens for determination as they may see
fit. The whole concept of jury trial is dependent upon the
members of the jury having been correctly instructed as to
the law by a trial judge. The function of the jury is to
decide facts. If the evidence in the case at bar fell short
of. p;resenting a question of fact on the matter of the defendant's negligence, then the duty of the court to instruct
the jury as to the law compelled it to dismiss plaintiff's
case, there being no question of fact upon which the jury
could properly deliberate. Therefore the force of Point
III

c~ntained

in plaintiff's brief is totally dependent upon

this court's decision on Points I and II thereof. We believe
the foregoing authorities demonstrate that the trial court
correctly decided the issues presented by Points I and II
of plaintiff's brief in favor of the defendant; consequently,
the dismissal of plaintiff's case was also proper and plaintiff has not been deprived of his right to trial by jury.
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C·ON·CLUSIO·N

We therefore respectfully submit that the court should
affirm the judgment of the trial court with costs to the
respondent.

Respectfully submitted,
BRYAN )?. LE·VERIC·H,
M. J. BRONSON,

A. U. MINER,
HOWARD F. ·C·ORAY,

D. A. ALS.UP,

Counsel for Respondent~
404 Union Pacific Bldg.
Salt Lake City, Utah
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